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UNITED STATES V HYUNDAI MERCHANT MARINE CO.:
BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING-BUT WHO SHOULD
PAY FOR HIS MONITORING COSTS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Times of crisis often spur people to act. This truism is certainly
valid in the context of an environmental crisis that prompts reme-
dial congressional and executive legislative action.1 It is no coinci-
dence that less than one year after the eleven million gallon Exxon
Valdez oil spill, Congress hastily formulated and enacted the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) 2 Unfortunately, Congress failed to
resolve many questions and concerns in OPA's text in its desire to
quickly enact OPA.3 One issue that remains open for debate is
whether OPA allows the government to recover monitoring costs
from a private party.4
The Ninth Circuit, through its decision in United States v. Hy-
undai Merchant Marine Co.,5 is presently the only circuit court in the
country that has decided whether the government can recover
monitoring costs under OPA.6 The Ninth Circuit ruled against Hy-
1. See Benjamin H. Grumbles & Joan M. Manley, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990:
Legislation in the Wake of a Crisis, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, 35, 35 (discuss-
ing public and legislative history of Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61
(1994)).
2. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104
Stat.) 484 (enacted Aug. 18, 1990) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61; 26 U.S.C.
§§ 4611, 9509 along with certain conforming amendments to other statutes) [here-
inafter OPA]. See Grumbles & Manley, supra note 1, at 35 (remarking that "[t] he
stalemate that characterized previous congressional efforts seemed to disappear
overnight").
3. See Sergio J. Alarcon & Flynn M. Jennings, Monitoring Costs Under the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990: A Blank Check for the Coast Guard?, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 419, 420
(1997) (pointing out that there are issues not properly reconciled in OPA's text
and germane statutes predating OPA, particularly monitoring cost recovery issue).
4. See id. (singling out monitoring cost recovery as major issue not reconciled
by OPA); see also United States v. Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co., 939 F. Supp.
489, 491 (E.D. La. 1996) (holding that removal costs under OPA include monitor-
ing costs); United States v. Conoco, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 581, 585 (E.D. La. 1996)
(holding that monitoring costs are included in removal costs and government
could seek such costs from responsible party under OPA); Conoco, Inc. v. United
States, 39 ERC 1541, 1544 (E.D. La.,Jan. 14, 1994) (stating, in dicta, definition of
removal costs in OPA was sufficiently broad to include monitoring costs).
5. 172 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 397 (1999).
6. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 6, United States v. Hyundai Merchant
Marine Co., 172 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1999) (Nos. 97-35538, 97-35820) (setting forth
suggested case law that circuit court should base its decision on).
(495)
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undai, a private party responsible for an oil spill, by deciding that
monitoring costs were fully recoverable by the Coast Guard, the
government agency overseeing Hyundai's ecological clean-up oper-
ation.7 Hyundai argued that OPA did not grant the federal govern-
ment the right to recover the Coast Guard's costs incurred while
monitoring the clean-up of a minor oil spill and challenged the
government's attempt to recover these costs on multiple grounds.8
This Note will focus on Hyundai's contention that the United States
Supreme Court's decision in National Cable Television Ass'n v. United
States9 demands that monitoring costs be treated as a tax.1°
Specifically, this Note addresses whether the Coast Guard has
statutory authority under OPA to bill a responsible party for costs
the Coast Guard incurs in monitoring that party's clean-up re-
sponse after an oil spill into navigable waters.11 Part II sets forth
the facts, procedural history and holding of Hyundai.12 Part III
presents the background of the monitoring cost reimbursement is-
sue, how it has been addressed under previous statutes and OPA,
and the prior judicial treatment of this debate and analogous con-
troversies. 13 Part IV reviews the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Hy-
undai.'4 Part V critiques the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that a
government agency can recover monitoring costs from a private
party under OPA.15 Finally, Part VI discusses the Hyundai decision's
7. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190 (explaining that monitoring costs are costs
incurred as result of oil spill that does not involve actual, physical removal of oil,
but rather oversight of removal process). These costs may include "personnel,
equipment, and investigatory costs, as well as the billing of the responsible party
for government helicopter overflights." Alarcon & Jennings, supra note 3, at 421
(noting it is difficult to say what is not included in monitoring costs).
8. For the arguments set before the Hyundai court, see infra note 28 and
accompanying text.
9. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
10. See id. at 342-43. "There the Court reminded Congress that it may not
delegate away its taxing power to an executive agency." Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190
(explaining that although Hyundai used National Cable as basis for its challenge, it
was not applicable here).
11. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1189 (discussing whether "removal costs" under
OPA includes "monitoring costs").
12. For a full discussion of the facts, procedural history and holding of Hy-
undai, see infra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
13. For a complete examination of the statutory and legislative support of the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Hyundai, as well as the relevant case law surrounding
this issue, see infra notes 30-114 and accompanying text. Specifically, for a full
review of this issue under analogous statutes to OPA, see infra notes 72-107.
14. For a thorough discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Hyundai, see
infra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
15. For a critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit's decision, see infra notes 130-57
and accompanying text.
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significance and its potential impact on future- oil spill salvage
operations.16
II. FACTS
In October 1991, the M/V Hyundai No. 12 grounded in the
Shumagin Islands of Alaska. 17 Each of the vessel's tanks, collec-
tively carrying 200,000 gallons of oil, was fractured and spilled
10,000 gallons of oil into the sea.'
The United States government immediately responded to the
initial threat by dispatching a Coast Guard team and equipment to
monitor Hyundai's attempts to contain the spill and free the ves-
sel.19 Though the Coast Guard stood ready for eleven days follow-
ing the grounding, its labor and technical services were neither
needed nor used.20 Hyundai was able to contain the spill, clean up
the oil, and free the ship without any outside assistance. 2'
The United States brought suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Alaska under OPA to recover its costs for
the Coast Guard's response to the Hyundai emergency.22 Initially,
16. For a hypothesis on the impact of the holding in Hyundai, see infra notes
158-70 and accompanying text.
17. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1188. The area surrounding the Shumagin Is-
lands is environmentally-sensitive land. See id. The threat of an oil spill potentially
endangered several species of wildlife. See id. at 1188-89 (noting that Shumagin
Islands are 260 miles west of Kodiak).
18. See id. The ship was carrying bunker oil, which has a "molasses-like consis-
tency" that "evaporates slowly" and "disperses poorly when exposed to the ele-
ments." Id. at 1188. In addition, the vessel was carrying a cargo of wheat. See
Appellants' Opening Brief at 6, Hyundai (Nos. 97-35538, 97-35820) (discussing
grounding of Hyundai tanker).
19. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1189.
20. See id. Initially, the Coast Guard responded to the spill through a search
and rescue mission (SAR) during which a federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC)
gathered information. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 6, Hyundai (Nos. 97-35538,
97-35820) (detailing Coast Guard's response measures). Once it was evident that
Hyundai could handle the clean-up operation, the Coast Guard made extra re-
moval equipment and personnel available to monitor Hyundai's operation. See id.
(commenting that Coast Guard made available four vessels and one air craft). Hy-
undai consulted with the Coast Guard regarding its plan to contain the spill and
free the ship, and the Coast Guard approved Hyundai's strategy. See Hyundai, 172
F.3d at 1189 (remarking that Hyundai's quick response to clean-up resulted in
only minor spillage).
21. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1189 (recognizing that minimal leakage occurred
prior to Hyundai freeing the ship and towing it to get repaired and that Coast
Guard did not perform actual clean-up of spill or salvage operation).
22. See id. In 1992, the government billed Hyundai for a total of $996,453.81
for the Coast Guard's costs incurred as a result of the grounding and subsequent
spill. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 6, Hyundai (Nos. 97-35538, 97-35820) (pro-
viding that this figure was excluding interest, penalties, attorney's fees or adminis-
trative costs).
20001 497
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the district court found that Congress did not intend to consider
the monitoring expenses that the Coast Guard sought as a "removal
cost" under the terms of the statute. 23 The district court stated that
it did not agree with the government's view that OPA's definitions
of "removal" and "removal costs" included the cost of monitoring
private response to oil spills.2 4
The United States sought reconsideration of the initial Hy-
undai decision. 25 After reviewing its original decision, the district
court in Hyundai reversed its holding and held that monitoring
costs were, in fact, included in the removal costs recoverable by the
government under OPA from the responsible party.2 6 The Hyundai
district court ultimately awarded 1.7 million dollars in removal costs
to the United States. 27 Hyundai then appealed the district court's
23. See United States v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 1995 A.M.C. 2168,
2172 (D. Alaska 1995) (examining pertinent OPA provisions and related statutes
as well as sparse legislative history of OPA, district court concluded that "Congress
clearly distinguished removal and monitoring activities and costs ... [and] limited
the recovery to removal costs. Other activities do not generate recoverable costs
24. See id. at 2171-72 (noting there must be nexus between oil spill and cost
claimed). In arriving at its decision, the district court in Hyundai noted, but re-
jected, dicta found in the United States District Court of Louisiana's decision in
Conoco Inc. v. United States. See id. (discussing Conoco in dicta and stating it's uncon-
vinced that by including definitional provision in OPA Congress intended to pro-
tect parties from arbitrary assessments).
The court in Conoco interpreted OPA and analogous statutes and stated that it
would "expand the definition of both 'removal' and 'removal costs' found [in
OPA]" such that removal costs would include monitoring costs. Conoco Inc. v.
United States, 39 ERC 1541, 1544 (E.D. La. Jan. 14, 1994) (holding review of pro-
priety of government's demand for reimbursement for action taken by Coast
Guard pursuant to OPA was not possible under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994)). The district court in Conoco said Congress' mere
inclusion of "definitional provisions" for "removal" and "removal costs" is not
enough to conclude that Congress had the intent of protecting the party responsi-
ble for the spill. See Conoco, 39 ERC at 1544 (commenting that relevant definitions
were not insufficiently broad to support government's interpretation). For a fur-
ther discussion of the decision in Conoco, see infra notes 102-07 and accompanying
text.
25. See United States v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 1996 A.M.C. 744, 744
(D. Alaska 1996) (reconsidering district court's first decision in Hyundai).
26. See id. at 746 (reversing its first holding in Hyundai case).
27. See id. (rehearing the case and determining that sections of OPA, albeit
obscured in statute, demanded deference to agency interpretation). The district
court stated:
The ambiguity which has been observed by the court as between the stat-
utory definition of "remove" and "removal costs" . . . calls into play both
the involved agency's own interpretation of the statute as well as legisla-
tive history .... [T] he agency view is that monitoring costs are recover-
able .
... [T] he legislative history of OPA... fails to support the court's initial
view that monitoring costs were not included in recoverable removal
costs.
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award on several grounds. 28 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's decision and held that monitoring costs
are recoverable removal costs under OPA. 29
Id.; see also United States v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., 172 F.3d 1187, 1188
(9th Cir. 1999) (stating damages awarded by district court in Hyundai case).
e 28. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1189 (analyzing Hyundai's assertion that United
States could not recover monitoring costs and that only "necessary" costs were re-
coverable). Hyundai also asserted that some penalties were incorrectly assessed
under the Debt Collection Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3717. See id. In addition, Hyundai
contended the government should not have been awarded attorneys' fees and,
finally, that the wrong rate schedule was used when estimating the Coast Guard's
costs. See id. (affirming district court's holding on all issues except penalty assess-
ment under Debt Collection Act).
On appeal, before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Hyundai argued that
OPA did not provide for the government's cost recovery of the Coast Guard's mon-
itoring activities over Hyundai's clean-up operation, "as opposed to the cost of
actual removal of oil." Id. (appreciating that Hyundai recognized its responsibility
to reimburse government for some costs incurred by Coast Guard's clean-up, but
disputed majority of costs). The claim was before the court as a matter of first
impression. See id. at 1188 (noting that no circuit had yet considered the issue). In
addition, Hyundai argued that the definition of removal costs excluded monitor-
ing costs. See id. at 1190 (commenting that every defendant that has challenged
monitoring costs reimbursement, in various courts, have raised this argument, but
to no avail). Hyundai stated that its argument was supported by a congressional
conference report. See id. at 1190 n.2 (rejecting Hyundai's argument that denial of
monitoring cost recovery is supported by H.R. CoNy. REP. No. 101-653, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1990)). The Congressional report states:
With respect to removal of any discharge or mitigation or prevention of
any substantial threat of a discharge, the President may assume responsi-
bility and costs of these actions subject to reimbursement from the re-
sponsible party; (i.e., "federalize the effort"); direct or monitor all
Federal, State and private actions; and remove and, if necessary, destroy a
vessel discharging or threatening to discharge.
Id. The Hyundai court interpreted the report so that "subject to reimbursement"
only applies to the first clause. See id. Finally, Hyundai argued that the separate
reference to "monitoring costs" and "removal" in a section of OPA supported its
position that the two terms were not ordinarily grouped together. See id. at 1190
nn.2-3 (disagreeing with Hyundai's position and holding "it is more reasonable to
apply the clause to the entire sentence").
Finally, Hyundai contested the charge of monitoring costs on the basis of the
Supreme Court's decision in National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States that only
Congress has the power of taxation and that agencies may only impose fees. See id.
at 1190-91 (citing National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336
(1974)). The imposition of a fee must be based on a number of factors that define
the difference between a fee and a tax. See National Cable, 415 U.S. at 341-43 (stat-
ing agencies may exact fees from private parties for services rendered based on
direct and indirect costs, value of service to recipient and public policy or interest
served). Hyundai argued that the reimbursement of monitoring costs effectively
functions as a tax. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190 (contending that if monitoring
cost is considered tax then it is not recoverable because National Cable determined
Congress has not made clear statement authorizing it). Further, Hyundai asserted
that when monitoring private party oil spill salvage operations, the Coast Guard, as
authorized by EPA, actually functions as an agency. See id.
29. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1193. For a full discussion and critique of the
decision and impact of the Ninth Circuit's holding, see infra notes 115-70 and
accompanying text.
4992000]
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of Monitoring Costs Recovery
Monitoring costs are defined as costs incurred by a govern-
ment agency in overseeing a private party's removal of ecological
waste and the costs incurred from performing remedial action after
an environmental hazard. 30 Prior to the Hyundai decision, no cir-
cuit court, and only a handful of district courts, had addressed
whether OPA's statutory language authorized the recovery of moni-
toring costs. 31 Recovery of monitoring costs, however, is often dealt
with under both the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) 3 2 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).3 3 RCRA and CERCLA are
30. See General Elec. Co. v. United States Dept. of Commerce, 128 F.3d 767,
775 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (discussing monitoring costs in the context of National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's final rule concerning liability for oil
spills under OPA).
31. See, e.g., United States v.J.R. Nelson Vessel, Ltd., I F. Supp.2d 172, 176 n.2
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) affd, 173 F.3d 847 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating in dicta that monitoring
costs are "clearly recoverable under OPA"); United States v. Murphy Exploration &
Production Co., 939 F. Supp. 489, 491 (E.D. La. 1996) (holding that term "removal
costs" under OPA includes monitoring costs); United States v. Conoco, Inc., 916 F.
Supp. 581, 584 (E.D. La. 1996) (holding responsible party strictly liable to pay for
removal and monitoring costs from discharge of oil under OPA); Conoco, Inc. v.
United States, 39 ERC 1541, 1544 (E.D. La. 1994) (stating in dicta that definition
of removal costs in OPA was sufficiently broad to include monitoring costs). Hy-
undai is the first case to reach a circuit court regarding this issue because the
grounding occurred only 45 days after OPA was passed and became law. SeeAppel-
lants' Opening Brief at 6, Hyundai (Nos. 97-35538, 97-35820).
32. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90
Stat. 2795, amended by Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (1980), amended by Pub.
L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k
(1994)) [hereinafter RCRA]. RCRA is the primary federal statute regulating haz-
ardous wastes. See 1 Susan M. Cooke, The Law of Hazardous Waste: Management,
Cleanup, Liability, and Litigation, § 1.01, at 1-3 (Susan M. Cooke & Christopher P.
Davis eds., 1999). Prior to RCRA's enactment in 1976, Congress passed the Clean
Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-42, and the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376, addressing pollution of the nation's air and waters. See id. Once
those statutes were implemented, however, disposal of materials on land, which
was an unchecked activity, increased. See id. Consequently, RCRA was enacted to
address disposal of hazardous land materials. See id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1491,
at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6239 (stating "The [RCRA] of
1976 is a multi-faceted approach toward solving the problems associated with the 3-
4 billion tons of discarded materials generated each year, and the problems result-
ing from the anticipated 8% annual increase in the volume of such waste.").
33. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 276 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)) [hereinafter CERCLA], as reauthorized and amended
by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections within 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
75 (1994)) [hereinafter SARA]. SARA was added to CERCLA for two reasons: first,
it allows "the government to place a federal lien on the property [of a responsible
[Vol. XI: p. 495
6
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol11/iss2/6
HYUNDAI MERCHANT MARINE CO.
similar because they authorize governmental removal cost recovery
from a private party.3 4 As a result, the courts that have examined
monitoring cost reimbursement under these statutes have based
their decisions on: (1) the interpretation of "removal costs;" and
(2) whether "monitoring costs" are included within these relevant
provisions of RCRA and CERCLA.35 In addition, the monitoring
cost reimbursement issue is also subject to "analysis under the Su-
preme Court's decision in National Cable Television Ass'n v. United
States,36 commonly referred to as the NCTA doctrine. Therefore, a
review of how monitoring costs are treated pursuant to the lan-
guage of RCRA and CERCLA, coupled with an examination of the
case law generated from these statutes, as well as the analysis of this
subject under the NCTA doctrine is necessary to understand the
monitoring costs reimbursement issue under OPA.37
1. Watchful Eyes Under RCRA
Enacted in 1976, RCRA set forth a complex plan for the fed-
eral regulation of hazardous wastes. 38 RCRA's primary purpose was
to reduce the creation of hazardous waste and regulate its storage,
transportation and disposal through a permit system.39 This com-
party] to secure reimbursement" for EPA clean-up costs; second, SARA increases
CERCLA's capacity "for allocating clean-up costs among responsible parties." De-
nise M. Schuh, Comment, The Cents of It: Dischargeability and Environmental Claims
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 14 N. IuL. U.L. REv. 191, 199 (1993) (citing CERCLA
§ 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988)).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h) and § 9607(a); see also United States v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1275-78 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that CERCLA provision
authorizing federal government to recover all "removal" costs does not include
costs incurred by government in overseeing hazardous waste clean-up performed
pursuant to RCRA).
35. See Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1275 (stating that "the key issue [is]: should
CERCLA's definition of 'removal' be read to encompass the government's activity
in overseeing removal or remedial action paid for and conducted by private par-
ties?"); United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that "[t]he
question presented is whether the government's oversight costs in a responsible
party clean-up are response costs under CERCLA").
36. 415 U.S. 336, 341 (1974) (holding that Congress must clearly indicate its
intent to delegate away its authority in order for executive agency to recover ad-
ministrative costs, whether fees or taxes).
37. See Francis J. Gonynor, Six Years Before the Mast: The Evolution of the Oil
Pollution Act of 1990, 9 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 105, 113-17 (1996) (outlining development
of governmental recovery of monitoring costs issue).
38. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92k (1994); see generally Reid Page et al., Comment,
Environmental Crimes, 36 Am. CRiM. L. REv. 515 (1999) (discussing nine statutes
governing enforcement of federal environmental regulations through criminal
prosecutions). Since its enactment, RCRA has been amended twice, most recently
in 1984. See id. at 532 n.105.
39. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 1, at 5 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6242 (stating "Pursuant to the regulatory authority pro-
2000]
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plex plan was designed to act as a "cradle to grave" regulatory sys-
tem for hazardous waste. 40
Pursuant to RCRA, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) may order owners and operators of hazardous waste sites to
monitor, test and analyze toxins levels present in soil surrounding a
facility.41 EPA, however, may perform these tasks if either the
owner is unable to do the work or the agency is unsatisfied with the
owner's efforts.42 In addition, RCRA expressly provides that EPA
vided by the [RCRA], EPA will administer the federal hazardous waste provisions
of this legislation. They require the Administrator to develop criteria for deter-
mining what is a hazardous waste, and then to list those wastes determined to be
hazardous. From point of generation, through transportation, storage, treatment
and disposal, those wastes listed as hazardous are federally regulated."); see also
Page, supra note 38, at 532 (remarking that Congress' intention was to eliminate
unregulated land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous waste); Ian G.
John, Note, Too Much Waste: A Proposal for Change in the Government's Effort to Clean
Up the Nation, 70 IND. L.J. 951, 953 (1995) (discussing background of RCRA). Just
prior to RCRA's enactment, solid waste was being produced in greater amounts
than ever before and the country's environmental stability was dissipating at a
rapid pace. See id. at 954 (observing that "millions of tons" of recyclable material
were being wasted every year).
40. See Page, supra note 38, at 532 (outlining regulatory system set forth in
RCRA); see alsoJohn, supra note 39, at 954 (explaining that Congress concentrated
on regulating generators, transporters, and hazardous waste treatment, storage,
and disposal facilities). RCRA was intended to create a unified effort to stop the
flow of improperly disposed waste among federal, state and local governments. See
id. (asserting that, unfortunately, potential effect of effort of that magnitude has
yet to be fully realized).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 6934(a) (1), (2). The relevant portion of RCRA states:
If the Administrator determines, upon receipt of any information, that-
(1) the presence of any hazardous waste at a facility or site at which
hazardous waste is, or has been, stored, treated, or disposed of, or
(2) the release of any such waste from such facility or site may pre-
sent a substantial hazard to human health or the environment, he may
issue an order requiring the owner or operator of such facility or site to
conduct such monitoring, testing, analysis, and reporting with respect to
such facility or site as the Administrator deems reasonable to ascertain
the nature and extent of such hazard.
Id.; see also Wyckoff Co. v. EPA, 796 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding EPA
correctly interpreted RCRA to permit it to order owner or operator of hazardous
waste facility to conduct monitoring, testing and analysis).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 6934(d) (1), stating in relevant part:
(1) If the Administrator determines that no owner or operator referred
to in subsection (a) or (b) of this section is able to conduct monitoring,
testing, analysis, or reporting satisfactory to the Administrator, if the ad-
ministrator deems any such action carried out by an owner or operator to
be unsatisfactory, or if the Administrator cannot initially determine that
there is an owner or operator referred to in subsection 9(a) or (b) of this
section who is able to conduct such monitoring, testing, analysis, or re-
porting, he may -
(A)conduct monitoring, testing, or analysis (or any combination
thereof) which he deems reasonable to ascertain the nature and extent of
the hazard associated with the site concerned, or
8
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may be reimbursed for the monitoring costs it expends in testing
and analyzing potential hazardous waste sites.43 Furthermore,
RCRA authorizes EPA to bring suit against anyone who harbors haz-
ardous waste and contributes to the "imminent and substantial en-
dangerment [of] health or the environment. ' 4 4
Additionally, through RCRA, EPA may force environmental
polluters to undertake appropriate corrective action through a pro-
gram aptly named the corrective action program. 45 The corrective
(B) authorize a State or local authority or other person to carry out
any such action, and require, by order, the owner or operator referred to
in subsection (a) or (b) of this section to reimburse the Administrator or
other authority or person for the costs of such activity.
Id.
43. See id. (stating in subsection (b) that Administrator may order private
party owner "to reimburse the Administrator or other authority or person for the
costs of such activity"). In contrast, if an owner carries out work ordered by EPA
pursuant to sections 6934(a) and (b), and EPA nonetheless performs its own test-
ing, monitoring and analysis of the site, EPA may not recover the costs it expended
if EPA's results are the same as those obtained by the owner. See id. § 6934(d) (2).
Additionally, RCRA says that the government may recover removal costs when per-
forming a clean-up for a private party. See id. Sections 6928 (a) (1) and (2) state:
(a)COMPLANCE ORDERS (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), when-
ever on the basis of any information the Administrator determines that
any person has violated or is in violation of any requirement of this sub-
chapter, the Administrator may issue an order assessing a civil penalty for
any past or current violation, requiring compliance immediately or within
a specified time period, or both, or the Administrator may commence a
civil action in the United States district court in the district in which the
violation occurred for appropriate relief, including a temporary or per-
manent injunction.
(2) In the case of a violation of any requirement of this subchapter where
such violation occurs in a State which is authorized to carry out a hazard-
ous waste program under section 6926 of this title, the Administrator
shall give notice to the State in which such violation has occurred prior to
issuing an order or commencing a civil action under this section.
42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1) and (2). The language that gives the Administrator of EPA
authority, through the district court, to grant "relief power" is the provision that
allows the government to recover removal costs. See COoKE, supra note 32, § 14.02
[3] [c], at 14-219 (discussing CERCLA's relationship to RCRA).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (detailing Administrator's authority).
45. See id. Section 6973(a) provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of evi-
dence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transporta-
tion or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment,
the Administrator may bring suit ... against any person (including any
past or present.., owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal
facility) who has contributed or who is contributing to such handling,
storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to restrain such person
from handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal, to order
such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both.
Id. Section 6973(a) also allows EPA to issue "orders as may be necessary to protect
public health and the environment." Id.; see also CooKE, supra note 32 (concluding
that EPA may seek relief from hazardous waste site dangers, either through litiga-
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action program aims to identify and redress environmental pollu-
tion at facilities that have RCRA hazardous waste permits.46 There-
fore, every facility with a RCRA permit is required to implement a
corrective action program. 47 Consequently, the corrective action
program reaches thousands of facilities throughout the United
States. 48 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit said that
"[g] iven the scope of the RCRA corrective action program and the
thousands of facilities involved, it is not surprising that EPA over-
sight of private [parties'] corrective action activities involves sub-
stantial expense. '49 In sum, EPA's costs incurred in monitoring
hazardous waste sites and in monitoring the corrective action pro-
gram are fully reimbursable. 50
2. Under the Glass in CERCLA
After RCRA's promulgation, it was clear that it contained gaps
and omissions.51 To pinpoint and remedy the pollution problems
caused by hazardous materials not addressed in RCRA, Congress
enacted CERCLA in 1980.52 Through CERCLA, Congress created
tion in court system or through use of its own administrative power, to ensure
prompt compliance).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (enumerating standards applicable to owners and
operators of hazardous waste facilities); see also COOKE, supra note 32, § 2.02, at 2-9
(discussing applicability of federal programs). Specifically, section 6924(u) directs
that issued permits require:
[C]orrective action for all releases of hazardous waste or constituents
from any solid waste management unit at a treatment, storage, or disposal
facility seeking a permit under this subchapter, regardless of the time at
which waste was placed in such unit. Permits issued under section 6925
of this title shall contain schedules of compliance for such corrective ac-
tion (where such corrective action cannot be completed prior to issuance
of the permit) and assurances of financial responsibility for completing
such corrective action.
42 U.S.C. § 6924(u).
47. See CooKE, supra note 32, § 1.02[3], at 1-8 (discussing strengthening of
EPA's enforcement capabilities through new monitoring authority and bolstering
of existing inspection section in Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980).
48. See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1270 & n.5 (3d Cir.
1993) (commenting that more than 4,600 facilities nationwide are within RCRA
permit provisions).
49. Id. at 1270 (footnote omitted). The Third Circuit held that costs incurred
by the government in monitoring the performance of a private party's clean-up of
hazardous wastes are non-recoverable monitoring costs. See id.
50. See id. at 1269 (stating that "[RCRA] provisions contemplate monitoring
and 'corrective action' to be performed and paid for by private parties").
51. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989) (dis-
cussing weakness of EPA's enforcement position in OPA since it was unable to
order private parties to clean-up waste sites unless they posed immediate threat to
society).
52. See id. (discussing CERCLA's origin).
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an extensive and "uniform system of notification, emergency gov-
ernmental response, enforcement, and liability."53 Primarily a re-
medial statute, CERCLA commissions EPA to clean-up hazardous
waste sites and identify and analyze the release of any unsafe materi-
als into the environment.54
CERCLA's statutory scheme provides for two methods of clean-
ing up a waste site.55 Section 106 of CERCLA authorizes EPA either
to: (1) bring suit against a responsible private party for reimburse-
ment of clean-up costs; or (2) order the responsible party to clean-
up toxic waste sites at its own expense.56 As a result, RCRA and
53. United States v. Carr, 880 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir. 1989) (commenting
that reporting requirements were to ensure that government would take swift ac-
tion to monitor hazardous release). Congress' purpose in enacting CERCLA was
"to initiate and establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to
abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive haz-
ardous waste disposal sites." H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, 22 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125. The Fifth Circuit stated that "CERCLA substantially
changed the legal machinery used to enforce environmental clean-up efforts and
was enacted to fill gaps left in an earlier statute, the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA)." Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 667 (commenting that
under RCRA, government was not authorized to order responsible parties to clean-
up waste sites unless they posed imminent threat to public health or welfare).
Through developing a method of regulation and financing of both governmental
as well as private response actions at waste disposal sites, CERCLA remedied
RCRA's problems. See Bulk Distribution Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp.
1437, 1441 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (confirming that CERCLA establishes "a means of con-
trolling and financing both governmental and private responses to hazardous re-
leases"); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Co., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D.
Minn. 1982) (finding congressional purpose of CERCLA is "to provide for liability,
compensation, clean-up, and emergency response to hazardous substances re-
leased into the environment").
54. See CERCLA § 104(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) (1); see also Page, supra note
38, at 548. EPA also must prioritize releases and threatened releases of toxic
materials by developing a National Priority List (NPL). See United States v. Rohm
& Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1270 (3d Cir. 1993) (asserting that CERCLA's primary
goal is to clean up and prevent hazardous waste sites).
55. See CERCLA § 104, 106, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606 (setting forth methods of
remediation). One commentator states, "[a]s an alternative to a governmental re-
sponse action followed by a cost recovery action, CERCLA authorizes the EPA, by
administrative order or judicial action, to compel responsible parties to perform
the required response action." 2 SUsAN M. COOKE, THE LAw OF HAZARDOUS WASTE:
MANAGEMENT, CLEANUP, LIALUiTy, AND LITIGATION, §12.02[4], at 12-20 (discussing
CERCLA's remedial scope).
During debate over CERCLA, three separate bills were under consideration.
See Amoco Oi4 889 F.2d at 667 (discussing development of CERCLA); United States
v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 905 (D.N.H. 1985) (setting forth background of CER-
CLA). The final version of CERCLA was a "last-minute compromise" between all
three bills. See Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 667 (quoting Mottolo stating that conse-
quently, CERCLA has become known, and deservedly so, for vague provisions and
ambiguous and conflicting legislative history).
56. See CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (a). Section 9606(a) states:
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local government,
when the President determines that there may be an imminent and sub-
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CERCLA are similar in that both statutes impliedly state that a gov-
ernment agency can recover removal costs when performing a
clean-up for a private party.5 7 According to section 104 of CER-
CLA, the government may respond to an actual or threatened re-
lease of toxic materials by undertaking a removal or remedial
action sua sponte.58 In addition to sections 104 and 106, section 107
mandates that the costs the government incurs through the per-
formance of any remedial action are recoverable from the party re-
stantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment
because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from
a facility, he may require the Attorney General of the United States to
secure such relief as may be necessary to abate such danger or threat, and
the district court of the United States in the district in which the threat
occurs shall have jurisdiction to grant such relief as the public interest
and the equities of the case may require. The President may also, after
notice to the affected State, take other action under this section includ-
ing, but not limited to, issuing such orders as may be necessary to protect
public health and welfare and the environment.
CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
57. See CooKE, supra note 32, § 14.02[3] (c], at 14 (comparing CERCLA sec-
tion 106 and RCRA section 6928 and noting similarities). To compare RCRA's
treatment of the reimbursement issue, see supra notes 43 and 50 and accompany-
ing text.
58. See CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). Section 9604(a) (1)
states in relevant part:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substan-
tial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release
or substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or
contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to
the public health or welfare, the President is authorized to act, consistent
with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal
of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant at any time (including its removal from any
contaminated natural resource), or take any other response measure con-
sistent with the national contingency plan which the President deems
necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment.
CERCLA § 104(a) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). Section 101(23) of CERCLA de-
fines "remove" or "removal" as:
[T] he clean-up or removal of released hazardous substances from the en-
vironment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the
threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such ac-
tions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or
threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed mate-
rial, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent,
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the
environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of re-
lease. The term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security
fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water
supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals
not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b) of this
title, and any emergency assistance which may be provided under the Dis-
aster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.]
CERCLA § 101 (23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
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sponsible for the release of the toxic waste. 59 The courts disagree as
to whether monitoring costs are included in the removal or reme-
dial actions proscribed by CERCLA. 60
3. The NCTA Doctrine
Before interpreting the language of RCRA and CERCLA, in
light of monitoring cost recovery, it is essential to first examine the
doctrine that resulted from the Supreme Court's decision in Na-
tional Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, popularly known as the
"NCTA doctrine."61 The NCTA doctrine, explained in Skinner v.
59. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). This section states:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-(1) the owner and
operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the time of dispo-
sal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of,... shall be liable for- (A) all
costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Govern-
ment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national con-
tingency plan; (B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan;...
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Additionally, Congress stated that CER-
CLA would "enable the Administrator to pursue rapid recovery of the costs in-
curred for the costs of such [removal or remedial] actions undertaken by him
from persons liable therefor and to induce such persons voluntarily to pursue ap-
propriate environmental response actions with respect to inactive hazardous waste
sites." H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119,
6120 (noting strengths of CERCLA in aiding enforcement of environmental laws).
60. Compare United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1278 (3d Cir.
1993) (finding that monitoring costs are not included in recoverable costs of re-
moval or remedial actions), with United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 401 (5th Cir.
1997) (finding that EPA's response costs are recoverable from private parties as
restitution).
61. See National Cable Television Ass'n, v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 337
(1974) (explaining that case centered around Independent Offices Appropriation
Act of 1952 which authorized federal agencies to impose regulation fee in return
for agency's services). The fee was to be determined by considering "the direct
and indirect costs to the Government, value to the recipient [and] public policy."
Id. at 337. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) imposed a fee on
community antenna television (CATV) systems and then added an annual fee for
each CATV system at 30 cents per subscriber to the system. See id. at 340 (observ-
ing that 30 cent fee was justified on ground that this was approximate "value to the
recipient"). The CATVs challenged the 30 cent fee, claiming it included a fee for
the "public policy or interest served." Id. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit had affirmed the FCC's decision holding that the "value to the
recipient" was the criterion to use in determining the standard and not the "public
policy or interest served" language which would then make the fee similar to a tax.
See id. at 342-44. According to the Fifth Circuit, if the latter standard was used, the
CATVs would be paying for the services they receive in addition to the benefits the
public receives by the FCC's services, and this is in direct contrast to the purposes
of the statute. See id. The FCC appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that
the "value to the recipient" was the proper measure of the fee authorized to be
imposed and remanded the case for the fee to be determined under the proper
standard. See id. at 344.
20001 507
13
Voegele: United States v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co.: Big Brother Is Watc
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
508 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XI: p. 495
Mid-America Pipeline Co.,62 states that "Congress must indicate clearly
its intention to delegate to the executive the discretionary authority
to recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit of
regulated parties by imposing additional financial burdens,
whether characterized as 'fees' or 'taxes,' on those parties. "63 In
recent case law, a trend has developed regarding the arguments
each party makes in a dispute surrounding the issue of monitoring
costs recovery based on the NCTA doctrine. 64
62. 490 U.S. 212 (1989).
63. Id. at 224. The Court held that Congress' delegation of its taxing power
to the Secretary of Transportation in order to establish a system of user fees to
cover costs of administering certain federal pipeline safety programs was not un-
constitutional because it placed many restrictions on the Secretary's discretion to
assess a pipeline user. See id.; see also American Landfill, Inc. v. Stark/ Tuscarawas/
Wayne Joint Solid Waste Management Dist., 166 F.3d 835, 838-39 (6th Cir. 1999)
(using National Cable as guidance, pointing out that primary difference is that tax
money is used for public purposes, and fees relate to individual benefits); United
States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 400-01 (5th Cir. 1997) (commenting that as per Na-
tional Cable, Congress must make clear statement of intent to impose fees on regu-
lated industries in order to collect those fees under its taxing authority); Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 567 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Skinner court's analysis of holding in National Cable with regard to need for clear
congressional statement in order to tax); Seafarers Int'l Union v. United States
Coast Guard, 81 F.3d 179, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting National Cable and noting
that Supreme Court distinguished between allowable user fees and unconstitu-
tional taxes); Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1273 (reiterating Skinner court's interpreta-
tion of National Cable and holding that oversight costs are akin to administrative
costs in National Cable).
64. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 400-01 (explaining that private parties argue that
under NCTA doctrine there must be a clear legislative statement prescribing such
recovery for government agencies to recover monitoring costs and, in turn, gov-
ernment agencies argue that NCTA doctrine is narrow and inapplicable in moni-
toring costs recovery cases); see also Atlantic Richfield Co., 98 F.3d at 567-69 (stating
that appellants based appeal on decision in Rohm & Haas, contending that NCTA
doctrine was applicable); Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1273-74 (outlining defendant's
contention that NCTA doctrine must be applicable for oversight cost recovery;
plaintiffs asserted that NCTA doctrine is only applicable to narrow set of circum-
stances); Maine v. Department of Navy, 973 F.2d 1007, 1014 (1st Cir. 1992) (using
NCTA doctrine, Navy argued that fees imposed on it by state of Maine were taxes
and therefore impermissibly imposed, whereas Maine asserted that NCTA doctrine
was inapplicable because compliance with state regulations benefitted Navy);
Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 317, 324-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(setting forth that "[iun arguing that the State is not entitled to cost incurred in
overseeing the remedial activities of the Town, defendants rely upon United States
v. Rohm & Haas, Co ..... In opposition, the State relies on . . . several recent
district court cases declining to follow Rohm & Haas."); California Dep't of Toxic
Substances Control v. Celtor Chem. Corp., 901 F. Supp. 1481, 1489-90 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (asserting that, despite defendants argument that NCTA doctrine was appli-
cable and allowed for recovery of oversight costs, district court found argument
unpersuasive and rejected that National Cable announced universal definitions of
fees and taxes).
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Monitoring costs are intended to safeguard the public interest,
as well as aid the interests of those being overseen. 65 Though dif-
ferent in nature, monitoring costs are often considered administra-
tive costs, analogous to the costs at issue in National Cable.66 As a
result, most defendants argue, pursuant to the NCTA doctrine, that
a clear declaration of congressional intent is needed before the gov-
ernment may be reimbursed for its monitoring costs. 67
The government, on the other hand, traditionally argues that
the NCTA doctrine does not apply to most cases dealing with moni-
toring cost reimbursement because National Cable involved a lim-
ited and separate issue: whether a regulatory agency, authorized to
collect fees from the entities it supervises, could calculate those fees
based on the agency's total costs incurred due to the supervision. 68
In contrast, according to the private parties, the issue in the major-
ity of monitoring costs cases is simply whether the applicable statu-
tory language provides for monitoring cost reimbursement. 69
65. SeeJohn, supra note 39, at 980 & n.192 (pointing out positive aspects of
Rohm & Haas decision because private parties can seek out EPA's advice leading to
efficient and effective clean-ups); see also Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1273 (examining
issue of oversight costs under NCTA doctrine). These "administrative costs" not
only "inure[ ] directly to the benefit of regulated parties," but also to the benefit of
the public at large. Skinner, 490 U.S. at 224 (elucidating NCTA doctrine and distin-
guishing between costs that are fees and those that are taxes).
66. See Skinner, 490 U.S. at 224 (discussing issue in National Cable that trade
associations representing community antenna television systems (subscribers)
which sought to set aside fee schedule of FCC which set annual fee each subscriber
had to pay to get space to air its programs at 30 cents per subscriber).
67. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 765, 772-73 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (invoking NCTA doctrine, petitioner argued that delegation of power
to tax to agency by Congress is prohibited without clear showing of intent); Town of
New Windsor, 935 F. Supp. at 326 (stating defendants relied on Rohm & Haas' inter-
pretation of NCTA doctrine); Celtor Chem. Corp., 901 F. Supp. at 1489-90 (pointing
out that defendant relied on NCTA doctrine interpreted by Rohm & Haas court
which stated that, "the federal government could not collect its oversight costs
because CERCLA provided no clear expression of Congress' intent to delegate
such authority to the Executive").
68. See Town of New Windsor, 935 F. Supp. at 326 (noting that State relied on
line of cases declining to follow Rohm & Haas' interpretation of NCTA doctrine);
United States v. Ekotek, Inc., 41 ERC 1981, 1984 n.1 (D. Utah 1995) (discussing
government's assertion and examining decisions by different courts rejecting Rohm
& Haas).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 400 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating
issue as whether defendants can be held liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA
for oversight costs); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564,
567 (10th Cir. 1996) (asserting that case centered on outcome of question whether
EPA oversight of private party clean-ups are costs for which appellants can be held
liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA, and are therefore not recoverable by At-
lantic Richfield); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1267 (3d Cir.
1993) (explaining issue as whether pursuant to CERCLA's liability provision, over-
sight costs incurred under RCRA are recoverable); United States v. Conoco, Inc.
916 F. Supp. 581, 582 (E.D. La. 1996) (explaining that government sought restitu-
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Specifically, the government typically contends that a statute regu-
lating a governmental agency's actions also authorizes that agency
to recover the costs it incurs while monitoring a private party's
clean-up or removal action.70 Consequently, the NCTA doctrine
begs the question of what degree of congressional expression is
necessary to impose liability. 71
B. Application of RCRA, CERCLA and the NCTA Doctrine to
the Monitoring Cost Reimbursement Issue
1. Monitoring Costs as a Taxing Issue
Stemming from the Supreme Court's decision in National
Cable, lower courts began to hotly debate the monitoring costs resti-
tution issue. 72 The leading case rejecting the view that monitoring
costs are recoverable under CERCLA and RCRA is the United
fion from Conoco under [OPA] for costs incurred by government in cleaning up
oil spills); Town of New Windsor, 935 F. Supp. at 324 (noting that town government
wanted reimbursement of oversight costs under CERCLA).
70. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 400 (stating that defendants "argue that the oversight
costs are not costs for which they can be held liable under section 107(a) of CER-
CLA"); Atlantic Richfield Co., 98 F.3d at 567 (noting appellant's contention that
"EPA oversight of a private party clean-up are not costs for which they can be held
liable under section 107(a)of CERCLA, and are therefore not recoverable by [At-
lantic Richfield Co.] under section 113(f)"); Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1267 (ex-
plaining issue as whether oversight costs incurred under RCRA are recoverable
"under CERCLA's liability provision"); Conoco, Inc., 916 F. Supp. at 582 (noting
that plaintiff sought "reimbursement from Conoco pursuant to [OPA]" for costs
incurred by government in cleaning up oil spills); Town of New Windsor, 935 F.
Supp. at 324 (explaining that State of New York sought recovery of oversight costs
under CERCLA).
71. Compare Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1274 (interpreting NCTA doctrine
broadly as requiring express congressional statement in statute for party to recover
monitoring costs), with Lowe, 118 F.3d at 400-01 (rejecting NCTA doctrine as bind-
ing on monitoring costs recovery issue, reasoning that NCTA doctrine narrowly
applies to cases concerning imposition of user fees on entities seeking to do busi-
ness and CERCLA is remedial statute authorizing payments by responsible party
for restitution of clean-up costs).
72. See United States v. Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co., 939 F. Supp 489, 490
(E.D. La. 1996) (involving government suit against Murphy for reimbursement of
monitoring costs pursuant to OPA); California Dep't of Toxic Substances Control
v. Celtor Chem. Corp., 901 F. Supp. 1481, 1484 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (stating that State
brought action against Celtor to recover costs from clean-up of hazardous waste
under CERCLA); Ekotek, Inc., 41 ERC at 1981 (articulating issue as whether EPA
could recover monitoring costs associated with clean-up of Ekotek refinery under
Consent Order pursuant to provisions of CERCLA); California Dep't of Toxic Sub-
stances Control v. SnyderGeneral Corp., 876 F. Supp. 222, 223 (E.D. Cal. 1994)
(stating issue as "whether CERCLA permits the Department to recover the supervi-
sory costs it continues to incur in overseeing defendants' private clean-up efforts");
County of Santa Clara v. Meyers Indus., Nos. 92-20246, 92-20521, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9847, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 1994) (questioning whether CERCLA re-
quires a private party to reimburse monitoring costs incurred by government).
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States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's decision in United
States v. Rohm & Haas Co.
7 3
In Rohm & Haas, the government brought a declaratory judg-
ment action under CERCLA to recover EPA's monitoring costs that
were incurred pursuant to an administrative consent order issued
under RCRA.7 4 The district court rejected R & H's argument and
73. See United States v. Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d 1265, 1265 (3d Cir. 1993) (find-
ing that holding departs significantly from prior case law); see also New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1985) (addressing government
oversight of private party clean-up and holding that government's costs in assessing
site conditions and supervising removal of waste, but not performing removal it-
self, are "response costs" under CERCLA). In addition, many courts have held that
pursuant to CERCLA, EPA may recover the administrative and indirect costs in-
curred during a clean-up operation. See, e.g., United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc.,
900 F.2d 429, 444 (1st Cir. 1990) (discussing EPA's contention that law requires
courts to award it administrative costs and stating, "We agree with EPA that . . .
courts should allow recovery of these indirect costs"); United States v. R.W. Meyer,
Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1504 (6th Cir. 1989) ("Given section 9607(a)'s authorization
for the government to recover all costs of its removal or remedial actions, we are
not persuaded that the government's indirect costs were unauthorized."); Kelley v.
Thomas Solvent Co., 790 F. Supp. 719, 729 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (finding that "indi-
rect costs . . . are reimbursable under CERCLA").
74. See Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1268. Rohm & Haas (R & H) entered into an
Administrative Consent Order pursuant to section 6928(h) of RCRA. See id. Ac-
cording to the Order, R & H was to conduct clean-up on all the sites involved in
the suit. See id. The order, however, did not provide for the government to be
reimbursed for its costs in executing the order. See id. R & H performed the re-
quired work and continued to do so through the subsequent litigation. See id.
R & H owned a landfill containing hazardous wastes, which it was required to
remediate. See id. at 1268. The case centered around a 120-acre landfill in Bristol
Township, Pennsylvania. See id. From 1917 until 1963, R & H owned the whole
site. See id. Fourteen and a half acres of the site were sold in 1963 to the Bristol
Township Authority (BTA). See id. Between 1968 and 1971, almost eleven more
acres were sold to Chemical Properties, Inc. (CP). See id. For 58 years, from 1917
to 1975, "R & H used the site for disposal of general refuse, process wastes, and off
grade products from R & H's plastics and chemical manufacturing plants." See id.
As of 1981, there were 309,000 tons of waste disposed at the site, 4,600 of which
were categorized as hazardous substances under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). See id. The
sites were investigated by both R & H and EPA and found to contain toxic materi-
als in the air, soil and groundwater. See id. EPA planned on adding the site to the
National Priorities List (NPL) under CERCLA, thereby ordering R & H to do cer-
tain work and to reimburse EPA for its portion of the work. See id. To conserve
Superfund funds and promote private clean-ups, EPA enacted a policy that held
that waste sites that could be regulated by both RCRA and CERCLA would be
handled pursuant to RCRA and therefore, not placed on the NPL. See id. at 1268
n.1. R & H asserted, however, that because it was willing to do all the clean-up
work itself, the site should be handled under RCRA, not CERCLA, and EPA
agreed. See id. In contrast to the Draft Consent Order under CERCLA that EPA
was originally going to issue, which provided for government reimbursement for
response and monitoring costs, the clean-up agreement R & H actually signed
under RCRA did not delineate any form of government monitoring cost recovery.
See id. at 1268-69.
Accordingly, R & H's work was still monitored by EPA, but was performed
pursuant to RCRA's remedial scheme. See id. at 1268 (explaining that over num-
ber of years, EPA conducted extensive monitoring of site and defendants' activi-
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held that because EPA agreed to manage the landfill under RCRA,
it was not barred from seeking oversight costs under CERCLA. 75
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court's deci-
sion.76 In comparing RCRA and CERCLA, the Third Circuit deter-
mined that the provisions for oversight and reimbursement in both
statutes were extremely similar.77 The circuit court then looked to
CERCLA's definition of "removal" and questioned whether it
should be read to cover EPA's activity in monitoring removal that
had been conducted at the private party's expense. 78 Finally, the
Third Circuit concluded that, pursuant to the NCTA doctrine, con-
gressional intent for government recovery of monitoring costs must
be explicit, and, therefore, any uncertainty as to Congress' intent
must be resolved in favor of R & H. 79 In so concluding, the Third
Circuit noted that reference to monitoring clean-up activities con-
ducted and paid for by private parties did not fall under the defini-
tion of "removal" in RCRA and CERCLA.80
The Rohm & Haas decision is significant because the Third Cir-
cuit is the only circuit court to decide that monitoring costs were
not recoverable under RCRA and CERCLA. 81 Since that decision,
ties thereby incurring thousands of dollars in monitoring costs). Nevertheless, the
government later brought suit pursuant to CERCLA to recover its monitoring and
response costs. See id. at 1268-69. The government sought to recover all costs in-
curred with regard to the site since 1979 under section 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607. See id. at 1268. For a discussion of the pertinent text of section 9607, see
supra note 59.
Additionally, since EPA was continuing to monitor the site, it sought a "declar-
atoryjudgement declaring recoverable all future costs incurred at the site." See id.
at 1268-69. R & H again argued that monitoring costs were not recoverable under
CERCLA, maintaining that because the bulk of EPA's costs were incurred after the
parties agreed to act pursuant to RCRA, CERCLA was not applicable. See id. at
1269.
75. See United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 790 F. Supp. 1255, 1265 (E.D. Pa.
1992) (holding that governmental monitoring costs were recoverable under CER-
CLA even though clean-up was performed under RCRA).
76. See Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1281. For a full discussion of the NCTA doc-
trine, see supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
77. See id at 1269-71. Compare section 107 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607, with
section 6934(d) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6934(d).
78. See Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1271 (stating that its determination of whether
CERCLA's definition of "removal" included monitoring costs controlled outcome
of entire issue). For the text of CERCLA's definition of "removal," see supra note
58.
79. See id.
80. See id. The Third Circuit found that there was no clear statement by Con-
gress regarding monitoring costs. See id.
81. See id. at 1275-78 (holding that CERCLA provision authorizing federal
government to recover all "removal" costs does not include costs incurred by gov-
ernment in overseeing hazardous waste clean-up performed pursuant to RCRA);
see also FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 841 (3d Cir.
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the overwhelming majority of district and circuit courts addressing
this issue have rejected the Third Circuit's reading of the germane
statutory language.82
2. Recoverable Monitoring Costs
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
jected Rohm & Haas'holding when it decided that monitoring costs
were recoverable by a government agency under CERCLA in United
States v. Lowe.83
1994) (stating that regulatory language should not be read broadly to allow for
recovery of monitoring costs); United States v. Serafini, 898 F. Supp. 287, 290
(M.D. Pa. 1994) (stating government could not recover administrative costs absent
clear congressional intent); United States v. Witco Corp., 853 F. Supp. 139, 142
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (relying on Rohm & Haas to hold that oversight and monitoring
costs are not recoverable under statutes at issue).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1997) (deter-
mining that government monitoring costs are not fees or taxes but restitution pay-
ments made by liable parties for clean-up costs and are therefore recoverable by
the government); accord Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, 98 F.3d 564,
568 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding costs of EPA monitoring or oversight of remedial
action (as opposed to removal action) were recoverable); United States v. Mon-
santo Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that all costs of removal
action, including monitoring costs, should be reimbursed by private owner);
Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 936 F. Supp. 1250, 1262
(E.D. Va. 1996) (noting that plaintiffs could recover the costs of oversight by EPA);
Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck Inc., 935 F. Supp. 317, 326-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(explaining that CERCLA response costs are payments by responsible parties, in
restitution, for removal actions and further recognizing that "oversight costs fall
squarely within statutory definitions of 'removal' and 'remedial' and are
recoverable").
83. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 404 (concluding that governmental monitoring of
private party's remedial or removal action qualifies as response under section
101 (25) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (25), and therefore responsible parties are
liable for costs of monitoring). Lowe centered around the clean-up of a Superfund
site in Texas used by a number of chemical corporations. See id. at 400. EPA or-
dered the site to be cleaned-up pursuant to section 106 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606. See id. In accord with EPA's order, the appellants completed the clean-up
themselves; however, the government monitored the clean-up operation. See id.
The site was certified as clean by EPA in April, 1993, thereby concluding all further
remedial action by the appellants. See id.
After the owners completed their own clean-up of the site, the government
filed a cost recovery action under section 107(a) of CERCLA to recover its re-
sponse costs, including monitoring costs. See id. The government sued to recover
all costs it incurred relating to the removal and remedial action. See id. In addi-
tion, the government sought a declaratory judgment holding the appellants liable
for all future response costs. See id. In defending its action, Lowe contended that
monitoring cost recovery from a purely private party clean-up operation was not
authorized under CERCLA. See id. Upon the government's motion, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the government and Lowe appealed.
See id. Monitoring costs were also awarded for the government's monitoring activi-
ties related to a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS). See id. at 400
n.1. This is a study that determines the type and extent of contamination at a site,
as well as the degree of risk to the public. See id. Finally, the study seeks to identify
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The Fifth Circuit agreed with the government and found that
the application of the NCTA doctrine to the monitoring cost reim-
bursement issue was inappropriate. 84 According to the court in
Lowe, CERCLA response costs are payments by responsible parties
that are comparable to restitution for clean-up charges incurred
while remediating a potentially or already contaminated site, and
not fees or taxes as characterized by the Third Circuit in Rohm &
Haas.85
The Fifth Circuit next examined the pertinent sections of CER-
CLA to determine whether they provide for monitoring costs recov-
ery. 86 The circuit court concluded that as long as the government's
actions are in accord with the National Contingency Plan, the costs
incurred are recoverable from the responsible party.8 7
techniques to use in the clean-up of the site, or at least ways to contain the contam-
ination. See id. The governmental monitoring costs related to the RI/FS were not
contested by the appellants. See id.
Lowe urged the Fifth Circuit to follow Rohm & Haas by applying the NCTA
doctrine, and find that for monitoring costs to be recoverable, Congress must
clearly state such intention in the statute. See id. at 400. Specifically, Lowe argued
that "National Cable's 'clear statement' requirement should be applied to CERCLA
because the administration of hazardous waste clean-up benefits the general pub-
lic, and the assessment of fees on specific parties for the payment of benefits to the
general public endows that fee with the character of a tax assessment." Id. at 401.
In addition, Lowe argued that as a de facto tax payment, the recovery of monitor-
ing costs by the government is not authorized under National Cable because there is
no language in the statute indicating a clear intent by Congress to have EPA reim-
bursed for such costs. See id. For a full discussion of the NCTA doctrine, see supra
note 61-71 and accompanying text. For a full discussion of the Third Circuit's
application of the NCTA doctrine to the issue of monitoring cost reimbursement,
see supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
84. See id. (stating that National Cable and subsequent cases pertain to "imposi-
tion of user fees on regulated entities seeking authorization to do business"); cf
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 601
F.2d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1979) (explaining that National Cable's characterization of
"fees" is akin to requesting public agencies to grant permits in order for businesses
to carry on trades). The Lowe circuit court noted that CERCLA is a remedial stat-
ute and does not estimate user fees on regulated industries. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at
401 (citing United States v. R.W. Meyer, 889 F.2d 1497, 1504 (6th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing that CERCLA is remedial in nature and fees cannot be imposed pursuant to
it)).
85. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 401 (stating, "CERCLA response costs are neither
fees nor taxes, but rather payments by liable parties in the nature of restitution for
the costs of cleaning-up a contamination"); see also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Ameri-
can Airlines Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 568 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that government mon-
itoring costs are not fees or taxes, but restitution payments made by liable parties
for clean-up costs); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Armco, Inc., 822 F.2d 1348, 1352 (4th Cir.
1987) (finding CERCLA relief is form of remedial, equitable relief).
86. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 401-04 (analyzing statutory language, particularly def-
initions, under CERCLA section 101).
87. See id. at 401-02 (noting that "the government may either conduct clean-
ups itself or permit or require responsible parties to do so") (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9604(a) and 9606). Quoting the language of section 9607(a) (4), the circuit
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The Fifth Circuit supported its holding by finding that the
plain language in the statute, namely the definitions of "removal"
and "remedial action" in CERCLA, are unambiguous.88 Addition-
ally, according to the Lowe court, the plain meaning of a term can-
not be determined in isolation, but rather the meaning should be
drawn from the context in which the term is used.89 As a result, the
Fifth Circuit held that although the term may be open to different
interpretations, it is not ambiguous when the context eliminates all
court stated that costs incurred by a private party or by the government in cleaning
up a site are recoverable under CERCLA. See id. at 402.
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit examined and compared the definitions of "re-
moval," "response" and "remedial action" under CERCLA. See id. For the full text
of CERCLA's definition of "removal," see supra note 58. CERCLA's definition of
'remedial action" includes:
[T] hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize
the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause
substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the
environment. The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the
location of the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection us-
ing dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, clean-up of re-
leased hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials,
recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes,
dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, col-
lection of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision
of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to
assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the
environment.
CERCLA § 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). Generally speaking, a "removal" is a
"short-term response" and a "remedial action" is considered a "long-term re-
sponse" or permanent resolution to the problem. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 402; see also
Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1533-34 (10th Cir. 1992) (examining lan-
guage of CERCLA and holding that any necessary costs consistent with national
contingency plan are recoverable).
88. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 402. The definitions of both "removal" and "reme-
dial action" contain the term "monitoring;" "monitoring," however, is not defined
within CERC[A. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 402 (pointing out uncertainty surrounding
meaning of "monitoring"). In accordance with traditional principles of statutory
construction, the Lowe court stated that a term not defined in a statute must be
given its ordinary and natural meaning. See id.; see also United States v. Alvarez-
Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357 (1994) (affirming rules for interpreting statutory con-
struction). Moreover, the undefined term must be construed in concert with the
overall policies and objectives of the statute. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 402; see also
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117-19 (1994) (examining how to interpret unde-
fined statutory terms); In re Locklin, 101 F.3d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasiz-
ing that undefined statutory term must be interpreted in context of its use within
writing).
89. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 402; see also Reich v. Arcadian Corp., 110 F.3d 1192,
1195-96 (5th Cir. 1997) (evaluating statutory construction of term not in isolation,
but in context in which it is used).
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but one meaning. 90 Thus, the Fifth Circuit determined that the
word "monitor" was interchangeable with "watch" and
"scrutinize."9 1
The Fifth Circuit next stated that under CERCLA, the term "re-
moval" is aimed at containing and cleaning up hazardous substance
releases, including those activities deemed necessary to prevent haz-
ardous releases from adversely affecting public health. 92 The Lowe
court stated that "EPA oversight, or monitoring, is certainly part
and parcel of preventing and minimizing the release of hazardous
substances."93 The Fifth Circuit concluded that governmental mon-
itoring or oversight of a private party's removal or remedial actions
is a "response" under CERCLA, thus, responsible parties are liable
for these costs. 94
C. Monitoring Costs and OPA
As explained earlier, OPA was enacted as a result of the Exxon
Valdez oil spill. 95 OPA amended, expanded and strengthened the
requirements of prior statutes addressing oil spill liability and com-
pensation.96 Preceding OPA, the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA) 97 authorized, but did not require, federal removal of
90. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 402-03; see also Reich, 110 F.3d at 1196 (discussing
ambiguity of term open to more than one statutory interpretation and holding
that context term is used in can disqualify all other possible meanings).....
91. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 403 (stating that, "[t]he verb 'monitor' is generally
synonymous with audit, check, control, inspect, investigate, observe, oversee, regu-
late, review, scrutinize, study, survey, test and watch"); see also Atlantic Richfield Co.
v. American Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 569 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing WILLIAM C.
BURTON, LEGAL THESAURUS 337 and WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 1460 (Philip B. Gove, ed. 1993) for definition of "monitor").
92. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 403.
93. Id. at 402.
94. See id. at 404 (basing holding on CERCLA sections 101(25) and
107(a) (4) (A)).
95. See S. REP. No. 101-94 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723
[hereinafter S. Rep. No. 94] (stating that Exxon Valdez and three other spills have
demonstrated great need for OPA).
96. See id. at 724 (citing inadequacies in existing federal laws dealing with oil
spill liability). Congress first tried to address the issues in OPA in The Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1924, which was repealed in 1970. See Gonynor, supra note 37, at 106.
Prior to that, the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1889, and the New York Harbor Act of
1888, also tried to remedy the oil pollution problem in U.S. waters. See id. at 107.
OPA is primarily concerned with: "1) strict pollution liability and compensation
for damages; 2) penalties for violation; 3) a pollution clean-up fund; 4) develop-
ment of improved vessel design to prevent pollution incidents; 5) enhanced vessel
communications and vessel traffic monitoring; and 6) enhancing and planning for
clean-up response activities in the aftermath of a pollution casualty." Id. at 108.
97. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376, amended by
33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1321, 1324, 1251-52, 1268-70 (1994) [hereinafter FWPCA].
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oil spills and approval of response plans.98 OPA's requirements
changed those set forth in FWPCA to require such efforts and to
expand governmental monitoring and clean-up responsibilities. 99
OPA also increased the potential liabilities of responsible parties
and significantly broadened financial responsibility
requirements. 100
Prior to the district court decision in Hyundai, only two cases
had decided the issue of monitoring cost recovery under OPA. 10 1
In the first of these cases, United States v. Conoco,102 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held that moni-
toring costs were recoverable pursuant to OPA.10 3 In 1992, two of
Conoco's vessels had spilled oil, and the government monitored
FWCPA consists of general oil spill clean-up provisions. See Michael P. Donaldson,
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Reaction and Response, 3 ViL. ENVrL. L.J. 283, 286
(1992). If it was determined that an owner or operator could not remove oil from
a spill themselves, FWCPA authorized the government to remove the oil. See id.
The Senate commented that, "[t]he [FWCPA]... has historically provided only
partial protection. The Act sets inappropriately low limits of liability for owners
and operators of vessels with respect to Federal oil spill removal costs and natural
damages, and provides no coverage or compensation for other damages." S. REP.
No. 94, at 724. Consequently, where OPA applies, certain provisions of FWCPA
that were once applicable are not now. See id. But see Gonynor, supra note 37, at
107 (stating FWCPA comprehensively addressed maritime oil pollution, "and con-
tinues to have vitality today"). When OPA was enacted, it amended FWCPA in
numerous ways, but FWCPA is still an integral part of federal pollution law. See id.
OPA cannot be mentioned without incorporating FWCPA because the case prece-
dent of FWCPA serves as a guide in interpreting OPA. See United States v. Conoco,
Inc., 916 F. Supp. 581, 585 (E.D. La. 1996).
98. See Gonynor, supra note 37 at 106-07 (discussing background of oil pollu-
tion legislation). OPA in its current state is very similar to the Oil Pollution Act of
1924. See id. (explaining that 1924 Act demonstrated concern for oil spills because
they posed serious threat of harm to maritime and fishing industries, and de-
creased values of beaches and shore properties). There were two oil pollution
control acts prior to the 1924 Act as well. See id. (commenting that 1888 New York
Harbor Act and 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act were first known statutes to address
water protection issue).
99. See id. (outlining changes that OPA injected into oil pollution legislation,
which before was solely governed by FWPCA, and noting that FWPCA is still very
viable and integral).
100. See id. at 109-10 (noting that although OPA broadened liability in many
respects, the ability to limit liability also exists if responsible parties follow OPA
guidelines).
101. See Conoco, 916 F. Supp. at 582 (considering whether monitoring costs
are recoverable by government under OPA); see also United States v. Murphy Ex-
ploration & Prod. Co., 939 F. Supp 489, 491 (E.D. La. 1996) (deciding whether
government agency can be reimbursed for monitoring costs).
102. 916 F. Supp. 581 (E.D. La. 1996).
103. See id. at 582 (explaining that case related to two different Conoco oil
spills into Gulf of Mexico). The first spill took place in February 1992, and the
second took place in April of the same year. See id. (noting that, with respect to
both spills, Conoco took prompt action in cleaning-up discharged oil and repair-
ing leaks).
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both clean-up operations. 10 4 To support its challenge to the gov-
ernment's monitoring costs assessment, Conoco argued that Con-
gress drew a distinction between monitoring activities and
monitoring costs. 10 5 The district court rejected this contention and
instead embraced the government's straightforward reading of
OPA.106 In effect, the district court read monitoring costs into re-
imbursable "removal costs" under OPA.107
In United States v. Murphy Exploration & Production Co.,10 8 the
same district court that decided Conoco again held that monitoring
costs were recoverable by the government. 10 9 Murphy had spilled
five hundred gallons of oil from its production platform into the
Gulf of Mexico. 110 Immediately, Murphy began a clean-up and
remedied the damage caused by the spill.1 11 Nevertheless, the
104. See id. During their oversight activities, the Coast Guard conducted heli-
copter overflights to determine where additional clean-up efforts were needed,
monitored Conoco's response action and investigated both incidents. See id. The
Coast Guard's costs for both spills totaled over $20,000. See id.
Both parties filed summary judgement motions regarding the issue of whether
the Coast Guard could recover monitoring costs. See id. Both parties agreed that
"removal costs" were recoverable under OPA. See id. For the definition of "re-
moval costs" under OPA, see infra note 107.
105. See id. at 583. Additionally, Conoco asserted a double taxation argu-
ment. See id. at 583-84. According to Conoco, monitoring was an agency opera-
tional cost intended to be paid by the Oil Spill Liability Fund. See id. Conoco,
however, already supported that fund by paying production and import taxes on
petroleum. See id. at 584. Thus, under Conoco's reasoning, the demand for moni-
toring costs constituted a double assessment. See id.
106. See id. The government advanced a clear, straightforward reading of the
pertinent sections of OPA. See id. For the text of those provisions, see infra notes
119-22 and accompanying text. In Conoco, the government argued, and the court
agreed, that is was necessary for the Coast Guard to oversee the clean-up efforts of
private parties to ensure that the efforts were adequate to control the spills. See
Conoco, 916 F. Supp. at 584. The court in Hyundai quoted Conoco and emphasized
that OPA authorizes not just "removal" of hazards but also "such other actions as
are necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare."
Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Conoco, 916 F. Supp. at 583).
107. See Conoco, 916 F. Supp. at 583 (supporting its finding, district court
noted that "[t]he very phrasing indicates that Congress understood the term re-
moval costs to include the cost of monitoring activities"). OPA's definition of "re-
moval costs" states: "[E]ach responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which
oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge of oil, into or
upon the navigable waters ... is liable for the removal costs and damages specified
in subsection (b) that result from such incident." 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
108. 939 F. Supp. 489 (E.D. La. 1996).
109. Id. at 491 (rejecting defendants contention that Conoco can be distin-
guished from issue in Murphy and instead following Conoco's analysis and holding).
110. See Alarcon & Jennings, supra note 3, at 434 (noting that government
sought almost $20,000 in monitoring costs, $17,000 of which was helicopter flights
over clean-up site).
111. Murphy, 939 F. Supp. at 490 (outlining not only Murphy's efforts to clean
site but also expenditures government made over three day period, "including re-
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United States sought to recover close to $20,000 in monitoring
costs.1 1 2 The parties voiced identical arguments to those made in
Conoco, and, not surprisingly, the district court arrived at the same
conclusion, that monitoring costs are recoverable under OPA.113
Consequently, the case law regarding monitoring cost recovery
under OPA has thus far been very favorable to the government's
interpretation of OPA's statutory language.11 4
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The issue before the Ninth Circuit in Hyundai was whether the
United States government may, pursuant to OPA, bill a private
party for costs incurred by the Coast Guard while monitoring that
party's clean-up of a threatened or actual oil spill.115 The Ninth
Circuit first considered Hyundai's argument that monitoring costs
did not constitute "removal costs" as contemplated in the statutory
language of OPA.116
In its consideration of Hyundai's argument, the Ninth Circuit
first reviewed OPA's definition of "removal costs" by reading several
provisions of OPA together with FWPCA provisions.11 7 First, the
Hyundai court examined OPA section 2702(a), which stated that
the "removal costs" set forth in section 2702(b) were recoverable by
view and monitoring of Murphy's clean-up plans and removal operations" and vari-
ous other activities).
112. See id. (commenting that government spent $17,000 on helicopter flights
to monitor release of oil into water and sent defendants bills to recover costs but
had to institute action in order to receive payment).
113. See id. at 490-91; see also Alarcon &Jennings, supra note 3, at 435-36 (stat-
ing that Murphy court adopted the reasoning set forth by Conoco court as its own
and that court in Murphy had "blind allegiance" to Conoco).
114. See, e.g., United States v. J.R. Nelson Vessel, Ltd., 1 F. Supp.2d 172, 176
n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) affd, 173 F.3d 847 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating in dicta that moni-
toring costs are "clearly" recoverable under OPA); Murphy, 939 F. Supp. at 491
(holding that term "removal costs" under OPA includes monitoring costs); Conoco,
916 F. Supp. at 584 (holding responsible party strictly liable to pay for removal and
monitoring costs from discharge of oil under OPA); Alabama State Docks Dep't v.
Compania Antares de Navegacion and Water Quality Insurance Syndicate, 1999
A.M.C. 309, 313 (S.D. Ala. 1998) (explaining that "removal costs" under OPA in-
clude costs of monitoring a responsible party's clean-up).
115. Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1188 (noting that OPA provides that responsible
party is liable for "removal costs and damages" including but not limited to, re-
moval costs incurred by government).
116. See id. at 1189 (highlighting that essence of Hyundai's argument was that
responsible party who expends millions of dollars to clean up oil spill should not
be required to pay United States for efforts that were duplicitous). For a full dis-
cussion of Hyundai's arguments before the Ninth Circuit, see supra note 28.
117. See id. (examining relevant provisions of OPA and cross-referencing
FWPCA since FWPCA is specifically cited in OPA).
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the government from a private party.1 18 Subsection (b)'s discussion
of "removal costs" led the Hyundai circuit court to FWPCA for gui-
dance on what constitutes those, costs. 119 Turning to FWPCA, in
particular to section 1321 (c), the Ninth Circuit found that the Act
required the President to protect against the threat of an oil spill
and secure the prompt removal of any discharge resulting from a
spill.120 In so doing, the President may: (1) take steps to lessen or
prevent the threat of a discharge of oil; (2) order the removal of
discharge; and (3) "monitor all ... private actions to remove a dis-
charge ... ,"121 Finally, the Ninth Circuit stated that subsection (c)
allowed the President to direct and monitor all actions to remove,
mitigate, or prevent the threat of a discharge of oil when there is a
substantial threat to the well-being of the United States or the fish
and wildlife within it.122
The Ninth Circuit read the above provisions concurrently and
concluded that they entitle the government to recover the Coast
Guard's costs of monitoring Hyundai's clean-up and removal.' 23
The Hyundai court found that by monitoring Hyundai's operation,
the government was overseeing a private party's clean-up and was
trying to lessen or prevent the threat of oil discharge. 124
118. See id. (analyzing issue through plain reading of statutory language). For
OPA's definition of "removal costs," see supra note 107.
119. See id. at 1190 (finding that cross-referenced provisions of two statutes
allowed Coast Guard to recover monitoring costs incurred while salvaging leaking
ship carrying 200,000 gallons of fuel). Subsection (b) provides: "The removal costs
referred to in subsection (a) of this section are (A) all removal costs incurred by
the United States... under subsection (c), (d),(e) or (1) of section 1321 of this tide
...." 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b).
120. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1189 ("[The FWPCA] directs the President to
ensure effective and immediate removal of discharge, and mitigation or preven-
tion of a substantial threat of discharge, of oil' into United States Waters.") (quot-
ing 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1)(A)).
121. Id. at 1189-90 (examining scope of executive's power to mitigate oil spills
under FWPCA). Sections 1321 (c) (1) (B) (i) and (ii) state that in carrying out those
duties enumerated in section 1321 (c) (1) (A), the President may: "(i) remove or
arrange for the removal of a discharge, and mitigate or prevent a substantial threat
of a discharge, at any time; (ii) direct or monitor all Federal, State, and private
actions to remove a discharge .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (c) (1) (B) (i),(ii).
122. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190 (determining that Coast Guard's actions
fall within these parameters because they were an attempt to lessen damage caused
by spill). Specifically, FWPCA states: "The President shall direct all Federal, State,
and private actions to remove the discharge or to mitigate or prevent the threat of
a discharge." 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (c) (2) (A).
123. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190 (rejecting Hyundai's assertion that Con-
gress did not intend for monitoring costs to be recoverable by government).
124. See id. The Ninth Circuit stated:
The Coast Guard's actions were an attempt to 'mitigate or prevent a sub-
stantial threat of a discharge,' section 1321(c) (1) (B), it was 'monitoring
... private action to remove a discharge,' section 1321 (c) (1) (B) (ii), and
26
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For further support of its holding, the Ninth Circuit turned
next to the definition of "removal costs" found in OPA, which in-
cludes costs to "prevent, minimize or mitigate" a potential oil
spill.1 25 Rejecting Hyundai's argument that the definition excluded
monitoring costs, the Ninth Circuit stated that the "Coast Guard's
monitoring activities are part of its effort to prevent or minimize a
threatened oil discharge."1 26 According to the Hyundai court, the
Coast Guard's "emergency stand-by" activities were an act of preven-
tion by the government and were "clearly recoverable under the
terms of the definition as it applies to the liability imposed by sec-
tion 2702."127
its monitoring was a means of 'direct[ing] private actions to remove the
discharge or to mitigate or prevent the threat of discharge' of oil, section
1321 (c) (2) (A).
Id. Additionally, the court did not agree with Hyundai's argument that OPA's con-
gressional history [H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1990)]
sanctioned its assertion that remuneration is not available for monitoring costs. See
Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190 n.2. The congressional report at issue stated: "With
respect to removal of any discharge, the President may assume responsibility and
costs of these actions subject to reimbursement from the responsible party; ...
direct or monitor all Federal, State and private actions . . . ." Id. (quoting H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 101-653, 101" Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1990)). Hyundai asserted that
the phrase "subject to reimbursement" only applied to the language in the first
clause, specifically "removal of any discharge or mitigation or prevention of any
substantial threat...." Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190. The Ninth Circuit rejected this
interpretation, concluding that the statement applies to the whole sentence. See id.
For instance, according to the Ninth Circuit, it is improbable that Congress did not
intend for the government to be reimbursed for its efforts at removing or destroy-
ing a vessel. See id.
125. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190 (dismissing Hyundai's contention that defi-
nition of removal costs excludes monitoring). OPA defines "removal costs" as:
"[T] he costs of removal that are incurred after a discharge of oil has occurred or,
in any case in which there is a substantial threat of a discharge of oil, the costs to
prevent, minimize, or mitigate oil pollution from such an incident." 33 U.S.C.
§ 2701 (31).
126. Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190. Hyundai relied on the narrower definition of
"remove" or "removal" to "no avail." See id. This definition states that "remove" or
"removal" means "containment and removal of oil or a hazardous substance from
water and shorelines or the taking of other actions as may be necessary to mini-
mize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare, including, but not limited
to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and private property, shorelines, and
beaches." 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (30). The court, however, found that the definition
was inapplicable because it did not include prevention. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at
1190. Under the court's reasoning, the broader definition of "removal costs" in-
cludes preventative costs. See id.
127. Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190. For the text of pertinent provisions of section
2702, see supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text. Hyundai also contended that
Congress' deliberate, separate reference to "removal" and "monitoring costs" in
section 2712(a) (1) demonstrates that "removal costs" do not normally include
"monitoring costs." See id. at 1190 n.3. Section 2712 of OPA deals with the author-
ized uses of the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. See 33 U.S.C. § 2712. Subsection
(a) (1) states that the fund will be used for: "the payment of removal costs, includ-
ing the costs of monitoring removal actions .... " 33 U.S.C. § 2712(a) (1). Exam-
20001
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit briefly addressed Hyundai's argu-
ment that on the basis of the reasoning set forth in National Cable,
the Coast Guard could not recover monitoring costs because, in ef-
fect, it would be imposing a tax on a private party, a function re-
served solely for Congress. 128 Without analyzing this issue under
the NCTA doctrine, the Ninth Circuit held that OPA authorized
the reimbursement of costs, not of taxes, and, therefore joined the
Fifth Circuit in holding that a clean-up cost is not a tax, and, thus,
monitoring costs are reimbursable.1 29
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In issuing its opinion, the Ninth Circuit followed the few dis-
trict court decisions which have held that the government can re-
cover its monitoring costs incurred in overseeing a private party's
environmental clean-up operation under OPA. i30 Circuit courts,
however, differ in resolving this issue.131 For example, the Third
Circuit interpreted the statutes narrowly, coupling them with the
NCTA doctrine, and held that both RCRA and CERCLA lack an
ining this provision, the Ninth Circuit said that the word "including" actually
suggested the opposite of Hyundai's contention and, in fact, a "monitoring cost" is
normally grouped in as a "removal cost." See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190 n.3.
128. See Apellants' Opening Brief at 6, Hyundai (Nos. 97-35538, 97-35820)
(outlining basis of argument set forth by Hyundai).
129. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190-91. The Ninth Circuit proceeded to affirm
the district court's holding that: (1) the United States was not limited to recover-
ing only those costs determined to be "necessary"; (2) the United States could
recover its base costs, as opposed to incremental costs; (3) the United States could
recover attorney's fees; and (4) the correct rate schedule was used in determining
Hyundai's bill from the Coast Guard. See id. at 1191-93. The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, reversed the district court with regard to the penalties assessed under the
Debt Collection Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3717, finding that penalties could not be imposed
on Hyundai pursuant to this Act. See id. at 1192.
For a full discussion of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Lowe, see supra notes 83-
94 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., United States v.J.R. Nelson Vessel, Ltd., 1 F. Supp.2d 172, 176
n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) affd, 173 F.3d 847 (2d Cir. 1999) (stating in dicta that under
OPA monitoring costs are plainly recoverable); United States v. Murphy Explora-
tion & Prod. Co., 939 F. Supp. 489, 491 (E.D. La. 1996) (holding that removal costs
under OPA includes monitoring costs); United States v. Conoco, Inc., 916 F. Supp.
581, 584 (E.D. La. 1996) (holding that pursuant to OPA, responsible party must
pay for removal and monitoring costs from oil discharge); Conoco, Inc. v. United
States, 39 ERC 1541, 1541 (E.D. La., Jan. 14, 1994) (stating in dicta definition of
removal costs in OPA was satisfactorily broad to encompass monitoring costs).
131. Compare United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1275-78, (3d
Cir. 1993) (finding that CERCLA provision authorizing federal government to re-
cover all "removal" costs does not include costs incurred by government in oversee-
ing hazardous waste clean-up performed pursuant to RCRA), with United States v.
Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that government's monitoring
costs of clean-up operation were recoverable pursuant to CERCLA).
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explicit congressional expression that monitoring costs should be
recoverable, and as a result, those costs are not reimbursable.13 2
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the statutes broadly, dis-
missing the NCTA doctrine as inapplicable in this issue, and held
that despite the absence of a clear congressional expression in the
statutes, monitoring costs are recoverable by the government. 133
The Third and Fifth Circuits engaged in a dual analysis of the
issue, first, examining it under the NCTA doctrine and, second, in-
terpreting the statutory language of RCRA and CERCLA.134 The
Third Circuit premised its decision in United Stated v. Rohm & Haas
Co. on the interpretation of whether the recovery of monitoring
costs are taxes or fees. 13 5 The Rohm & Haas court based its decision
on the NCTA doctrine and held that monitoring costs are adminis-
trative costs, which benefit the private or regulated party as well as
the public at large.13 6 Consequently, the dual beneficent result of
monitoring costs put them into the category of taxes. 137 Moreover,
the NCTA doctrine states that if Congress is going to delegate away
its power to tax, it must do so with a clear and explicit expression in
the statutory language.1 38 Neither RCRA nor CERCLA expressly
state that pursuant to its regulations, EPA may tax a private party
responsible for an environmental hazard.13 9 As a result, monitor-
132. See Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1278; see also FMC Corp. v. United States
Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 841 (3d Cir. 1994) (refusing to read regulatory
language broadly); United States v. Serafini, 898 F. Supp. 287, 290 (M.D. Pa. 1994)
(stating government could not recover administrative costs absent clear congres-
sional intent); United States v. Witco Corp., 853 F. Supp. 139, 142 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(relying on Rohm & Haas decision).
133. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 401; see also United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d
160, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that government monitoring costs are not fees
or taxes but restitution payments made by liable parties for clean-up costs). For a
discussion of the facts, rationale and holding in Lowe, see supra notes 83-94 and
accompanying text.
134. Compare Hyundai court's analysis, see supra notes 117-129 and accompa-
nying text, with Rohm & Haas court's analysis, see supra notes 76-80 and accompa-
nying text and Lowe court's analysis, see supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
135. Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1274 (invoking use of NCTA doctrine as sound
principle under these facts).
136. See id. (asserting that budget process gives executive agencies incentives
to operate efficiently, but when that agency can recover any costs expended, that
incentive is lost and accountability disappears).
137. See id. (insisting that presuming Congress' intent in writing CERCLA and
RCRA is beyond scope of judiciary and therefore only unambiguous definition of
removal will allow for recovery of costs by government).
138. See Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 224 (1989) (stat-
ing Congress must clearly indicate intent to delegate authority to recover adminis-
trative costs).
139. See Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1278 ("[T] here is no clear indication in [sec-
tion 9607, section 9604], the definition of removal, or [section 9606] that govern-
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ing costs are not recoverable. 140 The Third Circuit's application of
the NCTA doctrine in this context, however, is questionable.
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Lowe examined the
statutory language of CERCLA and held that monitoring costs are
included under the definition of "response" and, therefore, the re-
covery of such costs is authorized under a "remedial" or "removal
action" pursuant to CERCLA.141 In contrast to the Rohm & Haas
court's interpretation, the Lowe court stated that CERCLA does not
impose fees or charges on a regulated industry.142 Rather, CER-
CIA is a remedial statute and monitoring costs are restitution pay-
ments from the responsible party.143 Consequently, the NCTA
doctrine is inapplicable in examining this issue.144 Finally, looking
at the plain language of the statute and citing various provisions of
CERCLA, the Fifth Circuit concluded that monitoring costs are re-
coverable by the government. 145
Relatively little case law addressed this issue under OPA prior
to the decision in Hyundai.146 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit fol-
lowed these few existing district court cases in holding that the gov-
ernment was entitled to full reimbursement for its monitoring costs
from a private party. 147 In so doing, however, the Ninth Circuit did
not examine the monitoring costs reimbursement issue under the
ment oversight actions conducted in connection with [section 9606] (or RCRA
section 3008(h), 7003) were intended to be recoverable removal costs."); see also
CooKE, supra note 32, § 14.0215] [g], at 14-251 (stating "[slection [9606] does not
appear to contemplate either the incurrence or the recovery of governmental 're-
sponse costs'"). The court in Rohm &? Haas went on to say that section 9606 con-
tains separate remedies from those in section 9607. See Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at
1278. Section 9606 allows for penalties against a private party that does not follow
EPA's directives. See id.
140. See Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1278 (finding no clear congressional indica-
tion, as mandated by NCTA doctrine, that oversight costs are included in recover-
able costs).
141. For a full discussion of the Fifth Circuit's analysis and holding in Lowe,
see supra notes 83-91.
142. See United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 401 (5th Cir. 1997).
143. See id. (noting that government may either conduct clean-ups itself or
require responsible parties to do it).
144. See id. (holding that liability for all costs government and private party
incur in performing clean-up is imposed under CERCIA).
145. See id. at 403 (finding that "[gjovernment monitoring or oversight is an
inherent and necessary enforcement element of private party response action").
146. For a discussion of the case law which addressed this issue prior to Hy-
undai, see supra note 31.
147. See supra note 31 (citing district court cases that considered monitoring
cost recovery issue pursuant to OPA and finding that government could recover
monitoring costs).
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dual analysis used by the circuit courts in the Rohm & Haas and
Lowe cases. 14
8
Instead, although the conclusion in Hyundai was the same as in
Lowe and other circuits, the reasoning was different because the
Ninth Circuit used a pure statutory language analysis in concluding
that monitoring costs are recoverable.1 49 Beginning and ending its
analysis from the basis that "the definition of 'removal' costs under
[OPA] includes monitoring costs," the Ninth Circuit examined the
statutory language of OPA in accordance with FWPCA.150 The Hy-
undai court emphasized that OPA's definition of "costs of removal"
includes the Coast Guard's monitoring activities as a preventative
action.151
Nonetheless, the recovery of "monitoring costs" is not men-
tioned in any of the Ninth Circuit's cited definitions.152 The Hy-
undai court reached its conclusion by cutting and pasting selected
provisions of OPA and FWPCA together and reading words into
both statutes. 53 The Ninth Circuit decided Hyundai in a vacuum
by not analyzing the issue under the NCTA doctrine. 15 4 With very
few exceptions, most courts deciding the issue of monitoring costs
reimbursement have extensively examined the NCTA doctrine in
order to evaluate the doctrine's application in a particular case.' 55
148. See supra notes 117-29 and accompanying text for a complete discussion
of the Hyundai court's analysis of the monitoring costs reimbursement issue.
149. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1189-90. For a discussion of the Hyundai court's
plain language analysis, see supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
150. See id. at 1189.
151. See id.
152. For a full review of the OPA definitional provisions cited by the Ninth
Circuit, see supra notes 118-24 & 126-27 and accompanying text.
153. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1189-90.
154. See id. (declining to utilize NCTA doctrine in analysis of monitoring cost
reimbursement issue).
155. See United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 400 (5th Cir. 1997) (deciding
issue of whether defendants can be held liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA
for oversight costs by examining NCTA doctrine); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 567 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that decision in case
depended on analysis under NCTA doctrine of question whether EPA oversight of
private party clean-ups are costs fees or taxes); United States v. Rohm & Haas Co.,
2 F.3d 1265, 1267 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining outcome of issue as determined by
NCTA doctrine); Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States, 846 F.2d 765, 772-73
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (invoking NCTA doctrine, petitioner argued that delegation of
power to tax to agency by Congress is prohibited without clear showing of intent);
Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, Inc., 935 F. Supp. 317, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(noting that reimbursement of oversight costs under CERCLA was subject to reso-
lution of analysis under NCTA doctrine); California v. Celtor Chem. Corp., 901 F.
Supp. 1481, 1489-90 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (pointing out that defendant relied on
NCTA doctrine interpreted by Rohm & Haas court which stated that, "the federal
2000] 525
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In sum, the Ninth Circuit should have explained its reasoning
for dismissing the NCTA doctrine as inapplicable since it is the first
case to decide the monitoring cost reimbursement issue under
OPA. The Ninth Circuit should have followed other circuits' exam-
ples when considering this issue and addressed the NCTA doctrine,
as well as distinguished OPA from both CERCLA and RCRA. 156 In-
stead, the Ninth Circuit conducted no analysis with regard to the
NCTA doctrine and practitioners are left to wonder what particular
aspects of Hyundai and OPA are analogous to CERCLA and the line
of cases following Lowe.157
VI. IMPACT
Through its decision in Hyundai, the Ninth Circuit jumped
head first into the debate over monitoring cost reimbursement of
environmental clean-up operations. 158 By determining that the
government may recover monitoring costs, the Ninth Circuit joined
the Fifth Circuit and expressly disagreed with the Third Circuit's
decision in United States v. Rohm & Haas Co.1 59
Typically, clean-ups performed by a private party cost far less
than those conducted by the government.160 A private party has
government could not collect its oversight costs because CERCLA provided no
clear expression of Congress's intent to delegate such authority to the Executive").
156. See Lowe, 118 F.3d at 401 (rejecting NCTA doctrine as binding on moni-
toring costs recovery issue); Atlantic Richfield Co., 98 F.3d at 567-69 (rejecting appel-
lants' arguments based on decision in Rohm & Haas contending that NCTA
doctrine was applicable); Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1273-74 (explaining that NCTA
doctrine is applicable for oversight cost recovery and plaintiffs assertion that NCTA
doctrine is only applicable to narrow set of circumstances is incorrect); Mississippi
Power & Light Co. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 601 F.2d 223, 227
(5th Cir. 1979) (discussing National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States's character-
ization of "fees" in order to decide reimbursement issue).
157. See Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1189-90 (glossing over NCTA doctrine with re-
gard to this issue and dismissing it as inapplicable to case in question).
158. See supra note 71 (comparing holdings of two leading cases, Rohm &
Haas and Lowe, disagreeing on the monitoring cost recovery issue).
159. Compare Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1275-78, (finding that CERCLA provi-
sion authorizing federal government to recover all "removal" costs does not in-
clude costs incurred by government in overseeing hazardous waste clean-up
performed pursuant to RCRA), with Hyundai, 172 F.3d at 1190 (holding that gov-
ernment's monitoring costs of oil spill clean-up performed pursuant to OPA were
included in reimbursable "removal" costs). For a full discussion of the Third Cir-
cuit's decision in Rohm & Haas, see supra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
160. See John, supra note 39, at 952 (observing that because of their vested
interest, private parties are more expedient and economical in their clean-up oper-
ations than government). In some cases, those performing the actual clean-up are
private contractors hired by the government. See id. (noting that even privately-
owned contractors employed by government are cheaper than government run
clean-ups).
32
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol11/iss2/6
HYUNDAI MERCHANT MARINE CO.
the incentive to keep its costs low to save money. 61 On the other
hand, the government has no frugal incentive behind its actions,
and instead follows its planned course of action, regardless of cost,
safe in the knowledge that it will likely recover all incurred
expenses. 162
The entire purpose of statutes such as RCRA, CERCLA and
OPA is to ensure the efficient and safe clean-up of environmentally
hazardous or potentially hazardous waste sites by the parties respon-
sible for the pollution.1 63 Nonetheless, private parties that perform
their own clean-up and also must pay the government to monitor
their work, most likely will lose any incentive to fully comply with
the statutory regulations regarding clean-up.1 64 The Third Circuit
in Rohm & Haas, however, made compliance with RCRA and CER-
CLA less expensive for private, responsible parties and, therefore,
more attractive for them to quickly and efficiently perform the
clean-up needed to ensure a cleaner, safer environment.1 65 As a
result, the decision in Hyundai, which is in direct contrast to Rohm
& Haas, may have the adverse effect of encouraging non-compli-
ance and discouraging autonomous clean-ups.166
Furthermore, the potential economic impact on oil transporta-
tion costs cannot be discounted. The decision in Hyundai will affect
a large group of players in the transportation of oil, including pro-
161. See id. (emphasizing reasons why it is greater benefit to public, govern-
ment and private oil operators that private parties perform their own clean-ups).
162. See id. (observing that government is not most efficient clean-up operator
because it lacks incentives to keep costs low); see also Alarcon & Jennings, supra
note 3, at 421-22 (criticizing blank check courts have given Coast Guard in expend-
ing and recovering monitoring costs).
163. See John, supra note 39, at 954 (discussing purpose of RCRA); see also
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 1989) (describing rea-
son CERCLA was enacted was to create a means of overseeing and financing gov-
ernmental and private responses to hazardous releases); Gonynor, supra note 37,
at 114 (establishing purpose behind enactment of OPA).
164. See Alarcon & Jennings, supra note 3, at 440 (stating that "[11f responsi-
ble parties begin to weigh the cost of involving the Coast Guard against the cost of
penalties for not reporting a spill, a definite step in the wrong direction will have
precipitated"); see also Petition For Writ of Certiorari at 15, Hyundai, (Nos. 97-
35538, 97-35820) (discussing loss of incentives for private parties to perform any-
thing more than minimal response to clean-up its own spill if they know they will
have to pay their own response costs as well as government's costs).
165. See Gonynor, supra note 37, at 114 (noting that Third Circuit recognized
dilemma between having statutes that encourage private party clean-ups but at
same time also continue to encompass the government's interest in the clean-up).
166. See id. at 117 (observing that "vague and general standards may have the
requisite flexibility to deal with the wide variety of expenses that arise in connec-
tion with a pollution response operation, however, such ambiguity may not resolve
the differing perspectives of industry and government").
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ducers, consumers, insurers and claimants. 167 The oil producers'
costs will undoubtably rise as a result of the Hyundai holding; but of
even more concern is that the operational budget of the Coast
Guard will foreseeably rise as well. 168 Consequently, the increased
costs of the Coast Guard's budget will be subsidized out of the tax-
payer's pocket, both through taxes and higher oil prices, to finance
the producers' increased insurance costs. 169 In conclusion, the de-
cision in Hyundai almost certainly will have the effect of breeding
complacency amongst responsible parties, and few taxpayers will
appreciate the hit they may take in the pocketbook to pay for the
overlap that occurs when the government monitors private parties'
clean-up operations. 170
Eileen M. Voegele
167. See Alarcon & Jennings, supra note 3, at 439-40 (criticizing the Hyundai
decision and noting its potential impacts).
168. See id. at 440 (highlighting economic problems with Hyundai decision).
169. See id. (outlining economic and social issues that come with requiring
private parties to pay for governmental monitoring of private clean-ups).
170. See Gonynor, supra note 37, at 114 (observing redundancy of private sec-
tor performing clean-up of site and then being forced to pay government's costs of
monitoring progress).
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